I intend to post, on occasion, (probably quite frequently) the mini-essays that I produce from my lecture notes. I want for these to be a resource not just for me, but for other people. I am doing this principally to organise my notes, but it also has the secondary impact of allowing me to practise and hone my writing skills.
This is the essay that came of the notes I took in the first lecture of my module on the social, political and economic ramifications of World War One.
The Old Order: a world in crisis?
In an attempt to discover why the First World War changed from a local political incident into a world war, it is necessary to discuss several key questions. Firstly, it is necessary to ask why the world was in crisis. Had the shifting and changing of global empires placed new or undue strain on the contemporary political situation? Undoubtedly this is the case. Following the upheaval of Napoleon’s ravaging of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, a delicate balance was established and maintained under various international Congresses and treaties.
However, the strains of empire were beginning to show, if not visibly in the British and French empires, certainly in the case of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The latter of these groups converged on the Balkans, and thus were always going to be at risk of stepping on one another’s toes. The nationalistic ideals that were sweeping Europe at the time, on the back of the French revolution, served to increase the tensions in the Balkans.
The area of the Balkans consists of complex intermixing of ethno-national and religious groups, including Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Czechs. One of the key areas of conflict was Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Croats lived together. These split loyalties to the imperial powers, within the single state of Bosnia, made integration of cultures difficult.
The superficial strength of the Congress system, invoked after the Napoleonic period, was in the notion that as ‘civilised’ nations, the states of Europe could avoid war simply by resolving disputes in a civilised, diplomatic way. In this way the Balance of Power was maintained. However, as with any historical situation, it is possible to demonstrate weaknesses and failings of this idealistic system. The conflict in the Crimea is a good example. Russian attempts to secure the warm water port of Sevastopol on the Caspian Sea could not be tolerated by Britain and France, as allowing Russia year-round access to the world’s seas meant that both of these empires were more vulnerable, both economically and militarily.
Britain was perhaps the most interested in maintaining this congressional Balance of Power. This is understandable when one considers Britain’s imperial position, as the dominant global empire. She maintained this position through the strength of her navy to the point where she was accused in the nineteenth century of “gun-boat diplomacy”.
Britain’s preparedness to opt out of diplomatic disputes did little to help shake these jingoistic notions. The British public was very sensitive to losses of armed forces. One need look only to press coverage of the Indian Mutinies to see this. Coupled to this were the emerging problems in Ireland. However, while Britain’s empire remained perhaps the most secure. The French empire was in dire straits. With a falling birth-rate and her failure in the Franco-Prussian War, France was no longer feared as an imperial power. The falling birth rates in France also led to a paranoia about the strength of the military. The age range of conscription in France was enlarged to increase the size of the army.
The Russian empire was in a similarly poor position. The failure against Japan in 1904-5 undermined the authority of the Tsar and illustrated how ineffectual the Russian military was. However, some social attempts were made to improve the situation. The rail network was improved and attempts were made to increase living standards. The Russian rebellion of 1905 however, confirmed the demise of the Tsars.
The Austro-Hungarian empire was created to erase the tensions between the Hungarians, Czechs and Jews. It was to ruled by a Magyar and Austrian alliance. There had been attempts before to soothe the tensions in this area. The 1879 Austro-Hungarian alliance resolved some problems.
A revolution in Turkey in 1908 linked Germany and Turkey together. The Turks were keen to take advantage of Germany’s rail network, and their militaries worked in close consort. While Turkey had long had naval links to Britain, the link with Germany gradually became stronger until the British link was superseded. However, Germany was wracked with internal strife. The power of the Kaiser was under threat, because of the changes in leadership styles across Europe.
So perhaps what changed the situation was “The Serbian Question”. This was brought about by a pair of wars in the Balkans. The first, in 1912, involved an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro fighting the Turks. The victorious Balkan states then fought, in 1913, for control of the spoils of this fight. The changing positions of this outcome led Britain to take a far greater interest in Balkan politics and led what could have been a third Balkan war to become a major international event.
In 1911, David Lloyd George gave a speech at Mansion House in which he stressed the importance of the economic advantages of empire. He pointed out that Britain could not afford to stand idly by while the rest of the world cooperated. However, one could question German awareness of British intentions. In Britain and France, Germany was seen as a very militaristic. One of the key exponents of German militarism was General von Bernhardi. In “Germany and the Next War” Bernhardi is forthright about the power of German military.
However, militarism is not an entirely German phenomenon. It can be seen in other countries at the time. German realisation of this fact can perhaps be seen in the fact that she relied so heavily on her alliance with Austria-Hungary. As Huw Strachan has suggested, perhaps Germany should have realised that as a result of her alliance with Austria-Hungary, there was no hope of any Balkan conflict, however trivial, remaining localised.
This is the essay that came of the notes I took in the first lecture of my module on the social, political and economic ramifications of World War One.
The Old Order: a world in crisis?
In an attempt to discover why the First World War changed from a local political incident into a world war, it is necessary to discuss several key questions. Firstly, it is necessary to ask why the world was in crisis. Had the shifting and changing of global empires placed new or undue strain on the contemporary political situation? Undoubtedly this is the case. Following the upheaval of Napoleon’s ravaging of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, a delicate balance was established and maintained under various international Congresses and treaties.
However, the strains of empire were beginning to show, if not visibly in the British and French empires, certainly in the case of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The latter of these groups converged on the Balkans, and thus were always going to be at risk of stepping on one another’s toes. The nationalistic ideals that were sweeping Europe at the time, on the back of the French revolution, served to increase the tensions in the Balkans.
The area of the Balkans consists of complex intermixing of ethno-national and religious groups, including Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Czechs. One of the key areas of conflict was Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Croats lived together. These split loyalties to the imperial powers, within the single state of Bosnia, made integration of cultures difficult.
The superficial strength of the Congress system, invoked after the Napoleonic period, was in the notion that as ‘civilised’ nations, the states of Europe could avoid war simply by resolving disputes in a civilised, diplomatic way. In this way the Balance of Power was maintained. However, as with any historical situation, it is possible to demonstrate weaknesses and failings of this idealistic system. The conflict in the Crimea is a good example. Russian attempts to secure the warm water port of Sevastopol on the Caspian Sea could not be tolerated by Britain and France, as allowing Russia year-round access to the world’s seas meant that both of these empires were more vulnerable, both economically and militarily.
Britain was perhaps the most interested in maintaining this congressional Balance of Power. This is understandable when one considers Britain’s imperial position, as the dominant global empire. She maintained this position through the strength of her navy to the point where she was accused in the nineteenth century of “gun-boat diplomacy”.
Britain’s preparedness to opt out of diplomatic disputes did little to help shake these jingoistic notions. The British public was very sensitive to losses of armed forces. One need look only to press coverage of the Indian Mutinies to see this. Coupled to this were the emerging problems in Ireland. However, while Britain’s empire remained perhaps the most secure. The French empire was in dire straits. With a falling birth-rate and her failure in the Franco-Prussian War, France was no longer feared as an imperial power. The falling birth rates in France also led to a paranoia about the strength of the military. The age range of conscription in France was enlarged to increase the size of the army.
The Russian empire was in a similarly poor position. The failure against Japan in 1904-5 undermined the authority of the Tsar and illustrated how ineffectual the Russian military was. However, some social attempts were made to improve the situation. The rail network was improved and attempts were made to increase living standards. The Russian rebellion of 1905 however, confirmed the demise of the Tsars.
The Austro-Hungarian empire was created to erase the tensions between the Hungarians, Czechs and Jews. It was to ruled by a Magyar and Austrian alliance. There had been attempts before to soothe the tensions in this area. The 1879 Austro-Hungarian alliance resolved some problems.
A revolution in Turkey in 1908 linked Germany and Turkey together. The Turks were keen to take advantage of Germany’s rail network, and their militaries worked in close consort. While Turkey had long had naval links to Britain, the link with Germany gradually became stronger until the British link was superseded. However, Germany was wracked with internal strife. The power of the Kaiser was under threat, because of the changes in leadership styles across Europe.
So perhaps what changed the situation was “The Serbian Question”. This was brought about by a pair of wars in the Balkans. The first, in 1912, involved an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro fighting the Turks. The victorious Balkan states then fought, in 1913, for control of the spoils of this fight. The changing positions of this outcome led Britain to take a far greater interest in Balkan politics and led what could have been a third Balkan war to become a major international event.
In 1911, David Lloyd George gave a speech at Mansion House in which he stressed the importance of the economic advantages of empire. He pointed out that Britain could not afford to stand idly by while the rest of the world cooperated. However, one could question German awareness of British intentions. In Britain and France, Germany was seen as a very militaristic. One of the key exponents of German militarism was General von Bernhardi. In “Germany and the Next War” Bernhardi is forthright about the power of German military.
However, militarism is not an entirely German phenomenon. It can be seen in other countries at the time. German realisation of this fact can perhaps be seen in the fact that she relied so heavily on her alliance with Austria-Hungary. As Huw Strachan has suggested, perhaps Germany should have realised that as a result of her alliance with Austria-Hungary, there was no hope of any Balkan conflict, however trivial, remaining localised.
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