I think that this speaks for itself. Some incredible war photography! And a touching story.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/04/19/world/20090420-aliabad-ambush/index.html
Watch and respect.
btw
17 years ago
Showing posts with label War and Society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War and Society. Show all posts
19.4.09
This Economy Thing
Bank of England anticipates Spring 2010 end to Economy Woes
I have personally remained thoroughly apathetic about the whole economic downturn of the last couple of years. Sure, people have lost jobs, goods have been produced for markets that don't want them or can't afford them and global currencies have fluctuated like never before, but it could never have been all doom and gloom. The global economy simply doesn't function like that. Especially since the abandonment of the gold standard. The fiat system, essentially based on metaphysical IOU's, greatly reduces the value of money as well as its strength as a method of payment. It is no longer based on the value of, well anything except itself really, it is simply a stream of numbers flying about some bizarre ether.
Cash money and, increasingly, electronic fund transfers, now serve simply as a nominal markers of value. Maybe this caused the collapse of the US stock market that precipitated this current crisis. Perhaps, as I suspect, it is simply a natural, though unfortunate, side effect of a free market economy, in the same way that the Wall Street Crash was a natural downturn in the global economy. Obviously there were other factors at work both in 1929 and 2008 (interestingly, it was probably an after effect of war), but the outcome has been similar.
The point of all this, acknowledging that the world is in recession, something which, had it been acknowledged sooner, might have hastened its onset and thus its passing, rather than dragging it out and hiding it behind the euphemistic "Credit Crunch" moniker, is that it will inevitably end. It is not for the banks or governments of the world to fix. Free market economies, on the present scale, are a product of the industrial revolutions of the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. These are phenomenons which are still not fully understood. The implications of the first industrial revolution are being relived in the Green movement, as humans realise the impact their actions of the last century of burning. The ramifications of the second industrial revolution are being played out at 'tech shows' across the globe.
The Bank of England's announcement that the recession will be over by Spring of next year shouldn't be a surprise. Instead, it should be obvious. Anyone with a sense of history would be able to see that the world went from its darkest days in 1929 to mass slaughter, and the development of ultra-expensive, and essentially useless, weapons in just ten years. With modern technology, and Moore's Law, this turn around will be far swifter. Hopefully it won't be to the same end. Luckily, those "essentially useless weapons" play an important role here.
In acknowledging that last point, and in light of what I wrote yesterday, perhaps there is a cautionary nature to the current recession. After all, consider Nazi Germany. It rose from a crippled mess, to a force which could have succeeded in subjugating, if not the world, at least vast swathes of Western and Eastern Europe and tracts of Russian Steppes. Maybe it is worth engaging North Korea. She does possess some powerful "allies" in South East Asia and the Middle East.
I digress, for my point is not to draw comparisons between 1929 and 2008, aside from the inevitable recovery. The world would eventually collapse on itself without its interlinked economy. Of course, it's easy to say things like that, much harder to let them happen. But, I think that, like anything that goes wrong but will eventually recover, it's going to get worse before it gets better. But it will get better. I think that placing arbitrary signposts is a bad idea, as it will serve to further disappoint if it is not reached.
Cash money and, increasingly, electronic fund transfers, now serve simply as a nominal markers of value. Maybe this caused the collapse of the US stock market that precipitated this current crisis. Perhaps, as I suspect, it is simply a natural, though unfortunate, side effect of a free market economy, in the same way that the Wall Street Crash was a natural downturn in the global economy. Obviously there were other factors at work both in 1929 and 2008 (interestingly, it was probably an after effect of war), but the outcome has been similar.
The point of all this, acknowledging that the world is in recession, something which, had it been acknowledged sooner, might have hastened its onset and thus its passing, rather than dragging it out and hiding it behind the euphemistic "Credit Crunch" moniker, is that it will inevitably end. It is not for the banks or governments of the world to fix. Free market economies, on the present scale, are a product of the industrial revolutions of the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. These are phenomenons which are still not fully understood. The implications of the first industrial revolution are being relived in the Green movement, as humans realise the impact their actions of the last century of burning. The ramifications of the second industrial revolution are being played out at 'tech shows' across the globe.
The Bank of England's announcement that the recession will be over by Spring of next year shouldn't be a surprise. Instead, it should be obvious. Anyone with a sense of history would be able to see that the world went from its darkest days in 1929 to mass slaughter, and the development of ultra-expensive, and essentially useless, weapons in just ten years. With modern technology, and Moore's Law, this turn around will be far swifter. Hopefully it won't be to the same end. Luckily, those "essentially useless weapons" play an important role here.
In acknowledging that last point, and in light of what I wrote yesterday, perhaps there is a cautionary nature to the current recession. After all, consider Nazi Germany. It rose from a crippled mess, to a force which could have succeeded in subjugating, if not the world, at least vast swathes of Western and Eastern Europe and tracts of Russian Steppes. Maybe it is worth engaging North Korea. She does possess some powerful "allies" in South East Asia and the Middle East.
I digress, for my point is not to draw comparisons between 1929 and 2008, aside from the inevitable recovery. The world would eventually collapse on itself without its interlinked economy. Of course, it's easy to say things like that, much harder to let them happen. But, I think that, like anything that goes wrong but will eventually recover, it's going to get worse before it gets better. But it will get better. I think that placing arbitrary signposts is a bad idea, as it will serve to further disappoint if it is not reached.
18.4.09
How Do You Solve A Problem Like Korea?
What is to be done with North Korea?
The actions of the North Korean government over the past few days, beginning with the launch of a rocket, ostensibly as a communications satellite, and ending with yesterday's threats to withdraw from the Six Party Talks, the fragile backbone of what stability there is in South East Asia, have been predictably unpredictable. And with that epic sentence over with, let's discuss.
The rocket fired from Musudan-ri was hailed as a success by the North Koreans, and a failure by the American government. Inevitable, perhaps. Each side has their own propaganda. Each side wants to paint their own picture.
While the success of this launch may be debated, its ramifications are more clear cut. But they seem archaic. Born of Cold War-style mistrust, miscommunication and irrational fears. One of the key features of the Cold War, from a now distant standpoint was the amount of time spent, by both sides, living in unnecessary fear. Events like Able-Archer and the shooting down of KAL007 are two prime examples of crises that could have been averted with effective communication. Perhaps the closest the world ever came to nuclear war, the Cuban Missile Crisis, was essentially a miscommunication, based on unwarranted mistrust.
The Americans' heavy-handed approach to Communism was to blame for much of the course of the Cold War. Although, as a caveat, the Soviet Union did little to allay any fears the US government may have had. This relates closely to the present day problems within North Korea. It is clear that the US still has a latent "fear" of extreme left wing politics. Perhaps this is warranted, but perhaps it shouldn't be a fear that blinds, but a fear that garners respect and intrigue.
Is it not time that we learned to look past the colour of a flag, and allowed North Korea to come to the table, economically and politically? The sanctions on that country seem unnecessary. Perhaps a more open dialogue on the side of the UN and the US might engender trust from the Pyongyang, and possibly bring a peaceful and beneficial end to these seemingly petulant hostilities.
The rocket fired from Musudan-ri was hailed as a success by the North Koreans, and a failure by the American government. Inevitable, perhaps. Each side has their own propaganda. Each side wants to paint their own picture.
While the success of this launch may be debated, its ramifications are more clear cut. But they seem archaic. Born of Cold War-style mistrust, miscommunication and irrational fears. One of the key features of the Cold War, from a now distant standpoint was the amount of time spent, by both sides, living in unnecessary fear. Events like Able-Archer and the shooting down of KAL007 are two prime examples of crises that could have been averted with effective communication. Perhaps the closest the world ever came to nuclear war, the Cuban Missile Crisis, was essentially a miscommunication, based on unwarranted mistrust.
The Americans' heavy-handed approach to Communism was to blame for much of the course of the Cold War. Although, as a caveat, the Soviet Union did little to allay any fears the US government may have had. This relates closely to the present day problems within North Korea. It is clear that the US still has a latent "fear" of extreme left wing politics. Perhaps this is warranted, but perhaps it shouldn't be a fear that blinds, but a fear that garners respect and intrigue.
Is it not time that we learned to look past the colour of a flag, and allowed North Korea to come to the table, economically and politically? The sanctions on that country seem unnecessary. Perhaps a more open dialogue on the side of the UN and the US might engender trust from the Pyongyang, and possibly bring a peaceful and beneficial end to these seemingly petulant hostilities.
8.4.09
Origins of World War One
I intend to post, on occasion, (probably quite frequently) the mini-essays that I produce from my lecture notes. I want for these to be a resource not just for me, but for other people. I am doing this principally to organise my notes, but it also has the secondary impact of allowing me to practise and hone my writing skills.
This is the essay that came of the notes I took in the first lecture of my module on the social, political and economic ramifications of World War One.
The Old Order: a world in crisis?
In an attempt to discover why the First World War changed from a local political incident into a world war, it is necessary to discuss several key questions. Firstly, it is necessary to ask why the world was in crisis. Had the shifting and changing of global empires placed new or undue strain on the contemporary political situation? Undoubtedly this is the case. Following the upheaval of Napoleon’s ravaging of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, a delicate balance was established and maintained under various international Congresses and treaties.
However, the strains of empire were beginning to show, if not visibly in the British and French empires, certainly in the case of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The latter of these groups converged on the Balkans, and thus were always going to be at risk of stepping on one another’s toes. The nationalistic ideals that were sweeping Europe at the time, on the back of the French revolution, served to increase the tensions in the Balkans.
The area of the Balkans consists of complex intermixing of ethno-national and religious groups, including Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Czechs. One of the key areas of conflict was Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Croats lived together. These split loyalties to the imperial powers, within the single state of Bosnia, made integration of cultures difficult.
The superficial strength of the Congress system, invoked after the Napoleonic period, was in the notion that as ‘civilised’ nations, the states of Europe could avoid war simply by resolving disputes in a civilised, diplomatic way. In this way the Balance of Power was maintained. However, as with any historical situation, it is possible to demonstrate weaknesses and failings of this idealistic system. The conflict in the Crimea is a good example. Russian attempts to secure the warm water port of Sevastopol on the Caspian Sea could not be tolerated by Britain and France, as allowing Russia year-round access to the world’s seas meant that both of these empires were more vulnerable, both economically and militarily.
Britain was perhaps the most interested in maintaining this congressional Balance of Power. This is understandable when one considers Britain’s imperial position, as the dominant global empire. She maintained this position through the strength of her navy to the point where she was accused in the nineteenth century of “gun-boat diplomacy”.
Britain’s preparedness to opt out of diplomatic disputes did little to help shake these jingoistic notions. The British public was very sensitive to losses of armed forces. One need look only to press coverage of the Indian Mutinies to see this. Coupled to this were the emerging problems in Ireland. However, while Britain’s empire remained perhaps the most secure. The French empire was in dire straits. With a falling birth-rate and her failure in the Franco-Prussian War, France was no longer feared as an imperial power. The falling birth rates in France also led to a paranoia about the strength of the military. The age range of conscription in France was enlarged to increase the size of the army.
The Russian empire was in a similarly poor position. The failure against Japan in 1904-5 undermined the authority of the Tsar and illustrated how ineffectual the Russian military was. However, some social attempts were made to improve the situation. The rail network was improved and attempts were made to increase living standards. The Russian rebellion of 1905 however, confirmed the demise of the Tsars.
The Austro-Hungarian empire was created to erase the tensions between the Hungarians, Czechs and Jews. It was to ruled by a Magyar and Austrian alliance. There had been attempts before to soothe the tensions in this area. The 1879 Austro-Hungarian alliance resolved some problems.
A revolution in Turkey in 1908 linked Germany and Turkey together. The Turks were keen to take advantage of Germany’s rail network, and their militaries worked in close consort. While Turkey had long had naval links to Britain, the link with Germany gradually became stronger until the British link was superseded. However, Germany was wracked with internal strife. The power of the Kaiser was under threat, because of the changes in leadership styles across Europe.
So perhaps what changed the situation was “The Serbian Question”. This was brought about by a pair of wars in the Balkans. The first, in 1912, involved an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro fighting the Turks. The victorious Balkan states then fought, in 1913, for control of the spoils of this fight. The changing positions of this outcome led Britain to take a far greater interest in Balkan politics and led what could have been a third Balkan war to become a major international event.
In 1911, David Lloyd George gave a speech at Mansion House in which he stressed the importance of the economic advantages of empire. He pointed out that Britain could not afford to stand idly by while the rest of the world cooperated. However, one could question German awareness of British intentions. In Britain and France, Germany was seen as a very militaristic. One of the key exponents of German militarism was General von Bernhardi. In “Germany and the Next War” Bernhardi is forthright about the power of German military.
However, militarism is not an entirely German phenomenon. It can be seen in other countries at the time. German realisation of this fact can perhaps be seen in the fact that she relied so heavily on her alliance with Austria-Hungary. As Huw Strachan has suggested, perhaps Germany should have realised that as a result of her alliance with Austria-Hungary, there was no hope of any Balkan conflict, however trivial, remaining localised.
This is the essay that came of the notes I took in the first lecture of my module on the social, political and economic ramifications of World War One.
The Old Order: a world in crisis?
In an attempt to discover why the First World War changed from a local political incident into a world war, it is necessary to discuss several key questions. Firstly, it is necessary to ask why the world was in crisis. Had the shifting and changing of global empires placed new or undue strain on the contemporary political situation? Undoubtedly this is the case. Following the upheaval of Napoleon’s ravaging of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, a delicate balance was established and maintained under various international Congresses and treaties.
However, the strains of empire were beginning to show, if not visibly in the British and French empires, certainly in the case of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. The latter of these groups converged on the Balkans, and thus were always going to be at risk of stepping on one another’s toes. The nationalistic ideals that were sweeping Europe at the time, on the back of the French revolution, served to increase the tensions in the Balkans.
The area of the Balkans consists of complex intermixing of ethno-national and religious groups, including Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Czechs. One of the key areas of conflict was Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Croats lived together. These split loyalties to the imperial powers, within the single state of Bosnia, made integration of cultures difficult.
The superficial strength of the Congress system, invoked after the Napoleonic period, was in the notion that as ‘civilised’ nations, the states of Europe could avoid war simply by resolving disputes in a civilised, diplomatic way. In this way the Balance of Power was maintained. However, as with any historical situation, it is possible to demonstrate weaknesses and failings of this idealistic system. The conflict in the Crimea is a good example. Russian attempts to secure the warm water port of Sevastopol on the Caspian Sea could not be tolerated by Britain and France, as allowing Russia year-round access to the world’s seas meant that both of these empires were more vulnerable, both economically and militarily.
Britain was perhaps the most interested in maintaining this congressional Balance of Power. This is understandable when one considers Britain’s imperial position, as the dominant global empire. She maintained this position through the strength of her navy to the point where she was accused in the nineteenth century of “gun-boat diplomacy”.
Britain’s preparedness to opt out of diplomatic disputes did little to help shake these jingoistic notions. The British public was very sensitive to losses of armed forces. One need look only to press coverage of the Indian Mutinies to see this. Coupled to this were the emerging problems in Ireland. However, while Britain’s empire remained perhaps the most secure. The French empire was in dire straits. With a falling birth-rate and her failure in the Franco-Prussian War, France was no longer feared as an imperial power. The falling birth rates in France also led to a paranoia about the strength of the military. The age range of conscription in France was enlarged to increase the size of the army.
The Russian empire was in a similarly poor position. The failure against Japan in 1904-5 undermined the authority of the Tsar and illustrated how ineffectual the Russian military was. However, some social attempts were made to improve the situation. The rail network was improved and attempts were made to increase living standards. The Russian rebellion of 1905 however, confirmed the demise of the Tsars.
The Austro-Hungarian empire was created to erase the tensions between the Hungarians, Czechs and Jews. It was to ruled by a Magyar and Austrian alliance. There had been attempts before to soothe the tensions in this area. The 1879 Austro-Hungarian alliance resolved some problems.
A revolution in Turkey in 1908 linked Germany and Turkey together. The Turks were keen to take advantage of Germany’s rail network, and their militaries worked in close consort. While Turkey had long had naval links to Britain, the link with Germany gradually became stronger until the British link was superseded. However, Germany was wracked with internal strife. The power of the Kaiser was under threat, because of the changes in leadership styles across Europe.
So perhaps what changed the situation was “The Serbian Question”. This was brought about by a pair of wars in the Balkans. The first, in 1912, involved an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro fighting the Turks. The victorious Balkan states then fought, in 1913, for control of the spoils of this fight. The changing positions of this outcome led Britain to take a far greater interest in Balkan politics and led what could have been a third Balkan war to become a major international event.
In 1911, David Lloyd George gave a speech at Mansion House in which he stressed the importance of the economic advantages of empire. He pointed out that Britain could not afford to stand idly by while the rest of the world cooperated. However, one could question German awareness of British intentions. In Britain and France, Germany was seen as a very militaristic. One of the key exponents of German militarism was General von Bernhardi. In “Germany and the Next War” Bernhardi is forthright about the power of German military.
However, militarism is not an entirely German phenomenon. It can be seen in other countries at the time. German realisation of this fact can perhaps be seen in the fact that she relied so heavily on her alliance with Austria-Hungary. As Huw Strachan has suggested, perhaps Germany should have realised that as a result of her alliance with Austria-Hungary, there was no hope of any Balkan conflict, however trivial, remaining localised.
7.4.09
Normandy Trip
I was recently lucky enough to visit the D-Day beaches in Normandy, France. It was a truly humbling experience. Standing on the clifftops and looking down at Gold and Sword beaches, it's hard to see how anyone made it. It really gave me a good deal of perspective on my own life. Indeed, it's one of the inspirations behind this blog.
In Arromanches, the site of the Mulberry Harbours, there is a 360 Degree cinema. It has 9 screens arranged around a large room and it shows a combination of archive footage of the landings, cut with footage of the town today. It was very moving and it really helped me to imagine what it must have been like for the soldiers arriving in occupied France. There was also a small museum which contained uniforms, medals and the engine of a fighter plane which was discovered 5 metres underground! At this museum were models of the harbours which really brought home the scale of the operation.
After lunch (that seems a little frivolous somehow) we drove to Bayeux to look at the tapestry. It is an amazing thing. Something like 70 metres long, it shows the story behind the Norman invasion of Britian in 1066. It was truly astonishing to see it "in the flesh". It's beautiful. After the tapestry, we walked to another museum. It contains a great exhibition of some of the heavy weapons that were used during the Normandy campaigns. It was great to see all the hardware that was there. Another path into creating a more vivid picture in my mind of the conditions that were extant.
Following the Bayeux museum, we walked across the road to the British cemetery. It was a truly humbling experience. Something strange seemed to happen. It was as if we were walking into a church. Before we went through the gates, people were laughing, joking and horsing around, as soon as we got through the gates, there was silence and reverence. It was a beautiful place, haunting. There were British, Canadian and Polish graves and in one corner (in the distance to the left of this picture) there were a few German graves. It was a wonderful expression of compassion and kindness. Somehow it felt like it was an attempt at reconcilliation. You got the feeling that it was trying to bury the past and move on. That the German people, the German soldiers weren't necessarily part of the machinery and were simply doing what they were told. In the same way the Allied soldiers were.
The American cemetery at Omaha, I'm sorry to say, had none of the austerity or sense of reverence of the British cemetery. It felt far too ostentatious. I couldn't put my finger on it, but something about it felt wrong, as if it wasn't genuine. This led however to an interesting discussion with a friend yesterday. He had visited US memorials in Washington D. C. and had come to a similar conclusion. It seems that in Europe following 2,000 years of near-constant conflict, the conflicts in the first half of the 20th century finally showed us the hideousness of war. In America, and in the cemetery at Omaha, it seems that people are still "proud" of their war dead. In Europe, I feel that we are finally, as we should be, horrified of the impact of war.
All in all, though, it was a very humbling experience, and it gave me a great perspective on my own life. Especially seeing so many gravestones marking the resting place of men 6 years younger than me. It raised the old question, could I have done it? And I still feel like I could.
Following the Bayeux museum, we walked across the road to the British cemetery. It was a truly humbling experience. Something strange seemed to happen. It was as if we were walking into a church. Before we went through the gates, people were laughing, joking and horsing around, as soon as we got through the gates, there was silence and reverence. It was a beautiful place, haunting. There were British, Canadian and Polish graves and in one corner (in the distance to the left of this picture) there were a few German graves. It was a wonderful expression of compassion and kindness. Somehow it felt like it was an attempt at reconcilliation. You got the feeling that it was trying to bury the past and move on. That the German people, the German soldiers weren't necessarily part of the machinery and were simply doing what they were told. In the same way the Allied soldiers were.The American cemetery at Omaha, I'm sorry to say, had none of the austerity or sense of reverence of the British cemetery. It felt far too ostentatious. I couldn't put my finger on it, but something about it felt wrong, as if it wasn't genuine. This led however to an interesting discussion with a friend yesterday. He had visited US memorials in Washington D. C. and had come to a similar conclusion. It seems that in Europe following 2,000 years of near-constant conflict, the conflicts in the first half of the 20th century finally showed us the hideousness of war. In America, and in the cemetery at Omaha, it seems that people are still "proud" of their war dead. In Europe, I feel that we are finally, as we should be, horrified of the impact of war.
All in all, though, it was a very humbling experience, and it gave me a great perspective on my own life. Especially seeing so many gravestones marking the resting place of men 6 years younger than me. It raised the old question, could I have done it? And I still feel like I could.
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